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Benjamin L. Liebman1

Article 41 and the Right to Appeal
Extensive discussion of the Chinese Constitution focuses on the ways in which the
Constitution is under-enforced or not implemented.2 Many leading Chinese academics
used the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the enactment of the 1982 Constitution to
discuss ways in which enforcement of the Constitution could be strengthened.3 Similarly,
much of the discussion at this conference concerned possible ways to make the
Constitution enforceable. This essay takes a different approach, examining one clause in
the Chinese Constitution that is arguably at times over-enforced, providing constitutional
authorization for challenging legal determinations outside the legal system.	
  
This essay’s focus is Article 41 of the 1982 Constitution. Article 41 protects the rights of
citizens to criticize (piping 批评) and make suggestions (jianyi 建议) to state actors and to
file complaints (shensu 申诉), charges (konggao 控告), or exposures (jianju 检举) against
illegal conduct of state actors. Article 41 also requires state actors to deal with such
complaints.4 My central interest is in the meaning of the right to file complaints (shensu
申诉).5 My goal in this essay is to examine the ways in which the concept of shensu is
used to provide a basis for challenges to state action both within and outside the formal
legal system. My central argument is that Article 41 provides insight into structural
tensions inherent in China’s constitutional framework.
My interest in Article 41 stems from an ongoing empirical project that examines the
impact of petitioning on two Chinese courts.6 That project aims to show how and why
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1
Robert L. Lieff Professor of Law and Director, Center for Chinese Legal Studies, Columbia Law School.
This essay is adapted from comments delivered at the conference, “Social Change and the Constitution
– a Conference on the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the Constitution of the PR China of 1982”,
held at the Free University in Berlin, June 15-17, 2012.
2
Some recent scholarship has moved beyond this traditional framework of analysis, most notably Keith
Hand’s important work (Hand 2011: 60).
3
For examples of recent discussions, see the work of prominent scholars Zhang Qianfan, He Weifang,
and Tong Zhiwei (Zhang 2012a; He 2012; Tong 2012). For an excellent summary of recent writing on
the Chinese constitution see Yan (2013: 2-3).
4
The full text of Article 41 states: “Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to criticize
and make suggestions regarding any state organ or functionary. Citizens have the right to make to
relevant state organs complaints or charges against, or exposures of, any state organ or functionary for
violation of the law or dereliction of duty; but fabrication or distortion of facts for purposes of libel or
false
incrimination
is
prohibited.
“The state organ concerned must deal with complaints, charges or exposures made by citizens in a
responsible manner after ascertaining the facts. No one may suppress such complaints, charges and
exposures
or
retaliate
against
the
citizens
making
them.
“Citizens who have suffered losses as a result of infringement of their civic rights by any state organ or
functionary have the right to compensation in accordance with the law” (1982 Constitution, Art. 41).
5
At times shensu is translated either as “filing a complaint” or as “filing an appeal.” Yet “appeal” in the
context of shensu is distinct from an appeal in litigation, because few procedures govern the filing of
shensu and shensu are usually brought after court appeals have been exhausted or are not connected to
court proceedings. To avoid confusion I use the Chinese term shensu throughout this essay.
6
I have also discussed the impact of petitioning on China’s courts more generally in prior work (Liebman
2011).
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petitioning, even by individuals, is an effective mechanism for influencing the courts.
Court records reveal that petitioning is often an effective tool for individuals and groups
seeking to change already final court decisions or seeking direct compensation from the
state. Assessing the merits of such petitions is of course difficult. Some such cases almost
certainly involve wrongly or unfairly decided cases. Yet others involve grievances
brought by individuals facing hardship where courts likely have done nothing wrong, in
particular in cases where decisions are unenforced because defendants cannot be located
or lack resources to pay judgments. My interest in petitioning has led me to take a greater
interest in the concept of shensu – filing a complaint or appeal, a term that appears not
only in the Constitution but also in a number of specific laws. The concept of shensu is
not limited to complaints filed to the courts, but it is of particular importance in the courts,
when shensu are often handled alongside petitions and where the ability to shensu
provides recourse for litigants even after appeals have been exhausted and the time for
filing a formal rehearing petition has expired.
What does Article 41’s reference to the right to file a shensu mean? The provision has
received little scholarly attention. Scholarly discussion of Article 41, in China and the
west, largely consists of general references to the concept of a right to complain or notes
the relationship between Article 41 and the petitioning system. Sometimes the media cite
Article 41 as supporting the media’s right to “supervise” the state. (Liu 2013) (Feng 2013).
Few scholars discuss the specific meaning of Article 41, in particular the right to shensu,
or how it is enforced.7
The right to file a shensu includes a broad range of mechanisms for challenging state
action: petitioning through the letters and visits system, filing an administrative appeal,
administrative litigation, and filing a formal application for rehearing in a court case
(Zhang & Gu: 2011: 33-35). There is debate within China on whether to understand
Article 41 as providing a procedural right to challenge state action or a broader political
right to speak out and contest state action.8 Yet it is clear that the right to shensu includes
both the right to use formal procedures to contest state action and also to seek redress
outside of such formal procedures when such procedures either are not available or are not
effective. Shensu includes the right to challenge final court decisions through the legal
system and to challenge state action outside the legal system when legal procedures have
been exhausted and when legal remedies do not exist. Article 41 thus includes the right to
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
7
For example, see Chen (2009), arguing that the right to shensu means the right to file a complaint or
charge against state organs. One exception to this trend is the detailed study of Zhang and Gu (2011),
discussed further below, which analyzes the right to shensu and related statutory provisions in detail
from the perspective of administrative law. Zhang and Gu also provide an overview of existing
literature on Article 41.
8
Those who argue that the right to shensu is a procedural right focus on the ways that the concept is
implemented through formal law. Those who view Article 41 as providing a political right tend to
define shensu more broadly to include a range of action inside and outside the legal system. Zhang and
Gu (2011: 33-34) provide a good summary of existing debates on the meaning of Article 41. They argue
that legal provisions governing shensu can be broken down into four separate meanings: a basic right
under the constitution, a mechanism for seeking redress under administrative law, a means of initiating
rehearing procedures in the courts, and a mechanism for initiating the renewal of formal administrative
proceedings (Zhang & Gu 2011).
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challenge final decisions in the courts, but it is not specifically targeted at the courts.
Shensu petitions can be filed with a range of state actors.
In addition to the Chinese Constitution, 31 Chinese laws mention the right to petition
(Zhang & Gu 2011: 32).9 These provisions largely fall into two categories: those that
provide a formal procedure for challenging decisions and those that provide a general
right to relief outside of formal legal procedures (Zhang & Gu 2011: 33). Yet the
boundaries between formal and informal and between shensu and other mechanisms for
challenging state action are often unclear.
The role of shensu in procedural laws
Examination of the concept of shensu in China’s three primary procedural laws10 provides
insight into how Article 41 has been translated into practice in the courts and also into
some of the ambiguity that continues to exist. All three laws provide a legal basis for
challenging already final court judgments, although the particular terms and procedures
used to describe such challenges vary. Scholars cite these provisions as a mechanism by
which the constitutional right to file a shensu is made effective.
The concept of shensu is most clearly articulated in the Criminal Procedure Law. The
Criminal Procedure Law states that parties to a criminal case, their legal representatives,
or close relatives may challenge already decided cases by filing shensu petitions (2012
Criminal Procedure Law, Art. 241). The recently revised criminal procedure law states
that courts should retry cases in response to a shensu petition where there is new evidence
proving there was an error, where there was insufficient evidence or evidence should have
been excluded, where the original judgment included a misapplication of law, where there
was violation of procedure that might have affected the fairness of the outcome, or when a
judge handling the cases was involved in corruption or other illegal conduct (2012
Criminal Procedure Law art. 242).11 There is no time limit on when shensu may be filed.
The Supreme People’s Court has also specified requirements for shensu filings in criminal
cases (Criminal Procedure Law Interpretation, art. 372) and has instructed courts to
respond within three months, which may be extended to six months (ibid., art 375). If the
court determines that a shensu has merit the court then initiates (or orders a lower court to
initiate) a retrial. The 2012 Criminal Procedure Law added significant detail regarding the
specific requirements for filing a shensu compared to the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law.12
The new law thus provides a quasi-formal mechanism for challenging final criminal
judgments at any time through the filing of a shensu petition.
In contrast to the Criminal Procedure Law’s extensive reference to shensu, the Civil
Procedure Law largely speaks of litigants having the right to file a formal application for a
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
9
The Basic Laws of Hong Kong and Macao also use the term, but are not relevant to the discussion here
and thus are not included in the 31 laws listed.
10
China has not yet adopted an Administrative Procedure Act, only the narrower Administrative
Litigation Law. Scholars in China generally refer to the Criminal Procedure Law, Civil Procedure Law,
and Administrative Litigation Law as China’s three primary procedural laws.
11
The SPC’s interpretation in the Criminal Procedure Law also makes clear that a non-party to a case may
file a shensu petition if he or she believes that an incorrect final judgment has adversely affected his or
her legal rights ( Criminal Procedure Law Interpretation, art. 371).
12
For a discussion of the changes, see Zhang & Jiang (2012: 353-358).

retrial, or zaishen, to challenge an already final court judgment.13 The filing of a zaishen
application is time-limited: prior to 2013 litigants had two years from the issuance of a
final judgment to request a retrial. As of January 1, 2013, the time for filing a zaishen
application is six months (2012 Civil Procedure Law, art. 205). The 2007 Civil Procedure
Law had appeared to provide for a broader right to challenge final decisions: the 2007 law
also stated that challenges to already final cases should be handed as shensu (2007 Civil
Procedure Law, art. 111), thus suggesting a right to shensu in addition to a right to file for
retrial through zaishen proceedings. The 2012 revisions changed this provision to state
that litigants seeking to challenge already final court decisions should be instructed to file
for a zaishen, or rehearing (2012 Civil Procedure Law, art. 124); there is no longer
reference to a right to file a shensu. The change appears designed to limit the use of
shensu outside the formal retrial process. Yet even after the six month time period for
filing an application for retrial has expired a court or procuratorate may initiate a retrial on
its own initiative at any time. In practice this means that after the formal time period for
filing a request for a retrial has expired, litigants may nevertheless seek to convince courts
or procuratorates to initiate retrials.
In a recent book on civil rehearing procedures in the courts authors from the Supreme
People’s Court (SPC) attempted to address confusion about the difference between shensu
and formal retrial (zaishen) applications in civil cases. According to the authors, the
difference between shensu and zaishen is that zaishen petitions follow specific legal
requirements, while there are no constraints on or rules governing when and how a litigant
(or non-litigant) may file an application for a shensu (Su 2010: 1). The right to file a
zaishen is a procedural right; the right to seek redress through shensu is a constitutional
right. There are no time or jurisdictional limits on filing a shensu, and no limits as to who
may file such a petition. The authors thus explicitly state that in some cases a litigant may
use shensu procedures even when the challenge does not meet the legal requirements for a
zaishen (Ibid: 2). The SPC book further noted that the legal standard for courts deciding
whether to reopen a case is different depending on whether a litigant challenges a decision
through a shensu or a formal application for zaishen: in a shensu case a court must
determine there was an actual error before reopening the case. In a zaishen proceeding, in
contrast, the court determines that the procedural requirements set forth in the Civil
Procedure Law and relevant SPC interpretations have been met. The court then proceeds
to examine whether an error has in fact occurred. Thus in theory a court should not reopen
a case in response to a shensu unless the court determines there has been an error; in the
more formal context of rehearing courts only need to find that a party filing for a
rehearing has shown that an error has likely occurred.
One notable aspect of the SPC’s explanation of the scope of shensu is that the provision of
the Civil Procedure Law that the SPC authors suggest is relevant to filing a shensu does
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
13
Prior to recent revisions to both the Civil Procedure Law and Criminal Procedure Law the concept of
zaishen, or retrial, was also used in the criminal context. The revised Criminal Procedure Law appears
to try to separate out the concept of shensu in criminal cases from the more formal zaishen, or retrial,
proceedings in civil cases (Zhang & Jiang 2012: 353). Nevertheless, the terms continue to be used
interchangeably, even in official publications, because a successful criminal shensu leads to a formal
retrial. The Criminal Procedure Law continues to use the term zaishen to refer to retrials undertaken by
the courts, but does not use the term zaishen in the context of requests by individuals to reconsider final
judgments.

not actually mention the term. Article 177 of the 2007 Civil Procedure Law, incorporated
as Article 198 in the 2012 Civil Procedure Law, states that when a court president believes
that an error has occurred and that a case should be retried the court president shall refer
the matter for discussion and decision to the court adjudication committee. Clearly one of
the mechanisms for court leaders to become aware of such errors are shensu or petitions
or protests in cases that fail to meet legal requirements for retrials.
China’s Civil Procedure Law thus implements Article 41 of the Constitution both through
formal zaishen retrial procedures and through creating a catch-all mechanism for courts to
reopen cases at any time when errors are discovered. This is particularly likely in response
to shensu complaints from litigants who fail to meet the procedural requirements for
applying for a retrial. Article 41 thus provides a base both for formal legal procedures and
for litigants to seek redress even when they do not meet the requirements of such
procedures.
China’s Administrative Litigation Law and Court Organization Law also mention the
right to shensu. The Administrative Litigation Law states that a party to a case may
challenge a final court decision via a shensu (Administrative Litigation Law, Art. 62).14
The Court Organization Law likewise states that courts shall diligently handle any shensu
petitions concerning final court decisions (Court Organization Law, Art. 13). Neither
provides detail regarding how courts should handle such complaints.
Although the terms zaishen and shensu are often mixed, it is clear that the right to file a
shensu challenging a final court decision is broader than the right to file a rehearing
request. Shensu may be brought at any time, and outside the criminal law context there do
not appear to be limitations on who may file a shensu. In practice, however, within the
courts shensu petitions may be converted into rehearings. One recent study found that
most formal rehearing cases begin as shensu (Zhang & Gu 2011: 34). This is particularly
likely when litigants are challenging court decisions after the two year limit (now six
months) on filing a retrial application in civil cases has expired.

The role of shensu in administrative law
China’s three procedural laws provide the most important examples of how the right to
shensu is incorporated in statutory law. Yet the impact of Article 41 is not limited to
litigation. Examining the roles Article 41 and the right to shensu play in administrative
law in China shows a range of ways in which the right to shensu has influenced legal
development. Many of the 31 laws that make specific reference to shensu are substantive
administrative laws. Three aspects of the impact of the concept of shensu on
administrative law are of particular note.
First, Article 41 provided an important argument in support of the enactment of the
Administrative Litigation Law and the right of individuals to sue the government in the
1980s (Yan 2013: 9-10). Arguments were made during debates in the National People’s
Congress that a key goal of the Administrative Litigation Law was to ensure compliance
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
14
Although the Administrative Litigation Law uses the term shensu and makes no mention of zaishen
initiated by plaintiffs, subsequent judicial interpretations from the Supreme People’s Court referred to
the use of zaishen in administrative cases and imposed a two-year limit for litigants to apply for review
via zaishen procedures. As in the civil and criminal contexts, no time limitation applies to shensu.

with Article 41. Article 41 was also cited in arguments in support of similar rights to sue
the state in administrative laws governing specific substantive areas, such as the right to
sue the Marine Transportation Department under the 1983 Marine Safety Law (Ibid.).
Thus Article 41 can be understood as providing important support for the right of
individuals to sue the state.
Second, Article 41 has provided a mechanism for challenging final decisions in
administrative litigation and administrative reconsideration. Put differently, in
administrative cases the right to shensu provides a mechanism for protesting or
challenging outcomes in formal procedures, both in the courts and through administrative
review.
Third, Article 41 also provides a mechanism for seeking redress where substantive laws
have not provided formal mechanisms for seeking redress. A number of administrative
laws provide for a right to shensu even though they do not provide a right to bring an
administrative lawsuit or file for administrative reconsideration. Even in cases where a
right to sue or file for reconsideration does exist, the right to shensu may provide relief
where the subject of administrative action has failed to challenge administrative action
within the required timeframe. Thus, for example, the Civil Servants Law provides that
civil servants and others hired by state actors may bring shensu to challenge
administrative sanctions, even though such decisions are not reviewable in court or
through administrative reconsideration (Civil Servants Law arts. 13, 90, 91, 92, 94; Zhang
& Gu 2011: 34). Other laws, including the Teachers Law and the Judges Law, have
similar provisions. The Administrative Penalty Act, while providing a right to bring
formal challenges to the impose penalties, also provides for the right of citizens, legal
persons, and other organizations to bring shensu challenging administrative sanctions and
imposes an obligation on administrative actors to investigate such shensu (Administrative
Penalty Law, art. 54).
In administrative law Article 41 has provided a basis for formal legal challenges to state
action (the Administrative Litigation Law), a means of challenging the outcomes in such
formal challenges (through administrative review and zaishen rehearings), and a
mechanism for raising challenges even when laws provide no avenue of redress. Article
41 thus underpins both the right to use the legal system to challenge state action and the
right of individuals to perform an end-run around the legal system when dissatisfied with
an outcome or where formal law does not authorize their claims.
Substantive laws also make clear that petitions may go to a range of state actors – not just
the courts or administrative agencies. For example, the 2004 Organization Law of Local
People’s Congresses and Governments states that local people’s congress deputies have
the power to receive shensu and the “views of the masses” toward government
(Organization Law of Local People’s Congresses and Governments, art. 44). Article 41
says nothing about the involvement of the courts in enforcing or protecting the rights set
forth in Article 41 (Yan 2013: 9). Instead, one of the key uses of Article 41 in practice has
been to provide a remedy against perceived injustices in the courts.

Article 41 and the petitioning system
Perhaps the most significant and debated manifestation of Article 41 outside of statutory
law has been the petitioning system. Most scholarly debate surrounding Article 41 in

China focuses not on the meaning of shensu in statutory law but on whether the right to
petition (xinfangquan 信访权) is protected by the Constitution. Some scholars argue that
the petitioning system is a mechanism for enforcing the rights set forth in Article 41 (Shao
2010). Many scholars view petitioning as a political right providing for redress to citizens
for infringements of individual rights. Others contend that the petitioning system is a
mechanism for protecting other rights and that the petitioning system is needed because
the courts are unable to provide a sufficient remedy to individuals (Zhang 2010b). Still
other scholars disagree, arguing that petitioning remains wholly outside the legal system,
and thus that Article 41 should be understood only as providing a legal basis for specific
statutory provisions regarding shensu, not a constitutional right to petition. Scholarly
debate pays little attention to another possibility: that Article 41 provides a legal basis not
just for the existence of the petitioning system (and the right to shensu more generally),
but for the practice of petitions and shensu undermining court authority by providing
mechanisms for challenging final court decisions.15
The idea of an extra-judicial route to challenge state action is not new, in practice or in the
Constitution. All four of the PRC’s Constitutions have protected some form of the right to
file a complaint. The 1954 and 1975 constitutions spoke of the right to file charges
(konggao 控告) against illegal state action.16 The 1978 constitution added the right to
shensu alongside konggao.17 Scholars have argued that the 1954 Constitution imposed on
the state the obligation to create dedicated entities for receiving and responding to
complaints, as opposed to protecting the rights of citizens to air those complaints,
something already protected in theory by the constitution’s guarantee of free speech (Tu
2012). This was done through the creation of the petitioning system.
My empirical research on the influence of petitioning on the courts suggests that
petitioning to the courts undermines court authority and reinforces Party-state oversight of
the courts.18 My claim is not that the impact of petitioning on the courts stems from the
fact that the right to file complaints is set forth in the Chinese constitution. The right to
petition may be more robust than other provisions in the Constitution, but this is not
because of the Constitution. Likewise, the lack of finality in the legal system is not due to
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
15
Scholars inside China and in the west have argued that the petitioning system undermines the courts, but
have not generally noted that tension between petitioning and the authority of courts has a constitutional
basis in Article 41.
16
“Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to make written or oral charges to organs of
state at any level against any person working in an organ of state for transgression of law or neglect of
duty. People suffering loss by reason of infringement of their rights as citizens by persons working in
organs of state have the right to compensation” (1954 Constitution, Art. 97).
“Citizens have the right to lodge to organs of state at any level written or oral charges of transgression
of law or neglect of duty on the part of any person working in an organ of state. No one shall attempt to
hinder or obstruct the making of such complaints or retaliate ” (1975 Constitution, Art. 27).
17
“Citizens have the right to lodge to organs of state at any level charges of transgression of law or
neglect of duty on the part of any person working in an organ of state. Citizens have the right to
complain to state organs when they have suffered losses as a result of infringement of their civic rights
by any state organ or functionary. No one shall attempt to hinder or obstruct the making of such charges
or retaliate” (1978 Constitution, Art. 55).
18
As I have explained elsewhere (Liebman 2011), petitions regarding the courts may be filed both with
the courts and with other Party-state organizations outside the courts. Within the courts there appears to
be little difference between petitions and shensu.

Article 41, although Article 41 gives litigants the right to continue to appeal or file
complaints even after cases are final. Instead, the impact of petitioning on the courts
reflects the same historical tradition and political structure as does the Constitution. The
Constitution mirrors actual practice, whereby courts are not independent and decisions are
not final, and where substantive outcomes are more important than legal procedures.
Although Article 41 may have been designed to protect the right to expose and contest
official wrongdoing, it is operationalized in a way that undermines judicial authority
I am also not claiming that all of the rights in Article 41 are protected. That is clearly not
the case. But I am suggesting that in practice the right to shensu is at times more robust
than provisions in the Constitution that protect the independence of the courts. 19
Independence of the courts thus may be difficult or impossible to attain in China not just
due to political intervention; independence may also be impossible because of a system in
which mechanisms exist to challenge final decisions both inside and outside the courts.
Article 41 is one provision that mirrors actual practice, which is often not the case when it
comes to the provisions of the Chinese constitution.
The practice of allowing shensu petitions (and the constitutional recognition of the
practice) draws on China’s imperial tradition and on mass line ideology. It would be a
mistake to understand Article 41 as simply endorsing the practice of Party officials
intervening in court decisions; Article 41 draws on a deeper historical tradition of the state
providing direct redress to aggrieved individuals. There are, of course, precedents for a
constitutional right to petition the state elsewhere. For example, in the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution (although in the U.S. context the right to petition generally means
the right to petition the legislature, and is in practice part of the right to free speech). What
is different in China is that the right to seek redress of grievances covers the right to
protest already final court decisions and implies an obligation on the courts to reopen
cases when errors are discovered.
The impact of Article 41 on Constitutional reform in China
It is also important to note what Article 41 does not do. Article 41 is not a fundamental
requirement of transparency or informational disclosure by the state. Some in China have
drawn parallels to constitutional ombudsperson systems in other countries. This
comparison seems strained. Rather than creating an independent or autonomous oversight
institution, Article 41 represents a tradition in China of non-differentiation, both among
between legal institutions and non-legal institutions and among various Party-state
departments or entities. Article 41 reflects a system in which often overlapping
institutions resolve disputes and provide redress, not the creation of an external oversight
institution. Indeed one of the curious aspects of legal provisions concerning shensu is that
they appear to be designed to provide a mechanism for redress even where a law has
explicitly rejected formal adjudication or administrative review.
What does this mean for the questions at the heart of this conference and volume, and for
the future trajectory of Constitutional reform in China? Would reforming Article 41 or the
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
19
“The people's courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power independently and are not
subject to interference by administrative organs, public organizations or individuals” (1982 Constitution,
Article 126).

petitioning system make a significant change to the constitutional structure, or facilitate
better enforcement of other constitutional provisions? This essay’s brief examination of
Article 41 suggests three responses.
First, significant reforms to the petitioning system alone are unlikely to lead to broader
change. It is possible that they might pave the way for greater acceptance of the finality of
court opinions. But such changes are unlikely to make a large difference. Petitioning itself
is reflective of the problem of weak court authority; petitioning is not itself the source of
the problem. Likewise recent efforts to tighten requirements for the filing of retrial
applications in civil cases are unlikely significantly to reduce the pressure courts face
from petitioners. Article 41 suggests deeper structural issues that must also be addressed if
finality and court independence are to become characteristics of the Chinese legal system.
Second, can reform take place while the current system of allowing shensu and petitions
continues? Can constitutional rights be enforced in a system in which court decisions can
be reopened in response to petitions and protests at any time? One insight obtained from
analyzing Article 41 is that constitutional reform is not merely a question of allowing the
courts to handle constitutional claims. Any attempt to enforce the rights set forth in the
Chinese constitution needs also to confront the question of how to achieve a balance
between a system that is hyper-responsive to individual grievances and a system that
operates according to rules and procedures. The petitioning system sometimes helps
aggrieved individuals win redress. One reason that shensu and petitioning continue to be
important is that other avenues for seeking redress are often lacking or ineffective; formal
procedures often provide inadequate remedies for addressing grievances. The fact that
many shensu relate to administrative action – and to administrative litigation -- suggests
that courts are not yet in a position to address such problems (Yan 2013: 9-10). But the
continued importance of both shensu and petitioning also reinforces a message that legal
institutions lack a privileged position for adjudicating rights.
Third, this essay also raises a theoretical question: can finality be obtained in a system that
continues to have a never-ending right to appeal? If not, does the enforcement of
constitutional rights require either courts to play leading roles or court decisions to be
final? Most other systems that have undergone constitutional transitions have opted for
finality as a core value of rule of law. China has thus far taken a different path,
maintaining a system that focuses on the substantive correctness of decisions. Such an
approach reflects historical tradition and concern about the legitimacy of the state.
Many in China and the west have argued that this practice is not sustainable in the context
of a modern legal system. Yet this perhaps may be yet another area where Chinese legal
reform has the potential to challenge conventional wisdom. In a society undergoing rapid
and radical change, providing a general mechanism for challenging state action even
where law does not formally provide for such challenges may be important not only for
preserving state legitimacy but also for addressing injustice. Examination of Article 41
suggests that there may be theoretical justification for the continuation of the system, in
particular if courts continue to lack significant power to review state action. Article 41 has
largely remained in the background in discussions about the constitution and about
institutional reform in China. Yet addressing the tension inherent in Article 41 may be
central to efforts to enforce the constitution and to deepen institutional reforms.
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